Tuesday, 28 November 2017

ritch

kuch andheri raat thi
ek jagmata sitara
chip rha tha kahi
sayo me baadlo me



gumsum si thi wo chandani
us mayus raat me
chip rahi thi kahi us anderi raat me

jaise cheen rahe tho wo
chand lamhat jindagi ke
badalo k beech kahi
 kho gayi wo roshni

chup thi wo raat
aur  chup tha mai
gumsum sa kahi
gumsum sa sahi

kaha gai wo chandani
kaha gai wo roshni

dariya hai jo wo paar kaha hoga
naavik ek vipdaye anek
sahil kahi nazar me nhi

Friday, 27 October 2017

pri

scheme aimed at incentivization of States for devolving funds,
functions and functionaries (3Fs) to Panchayats and incentivization of Panchayats to
put in place accountability systems to make their functioning transparent and efficient.
yy The scheme is 100% centrally funded.
yy State Governments/UTs are ranked on a Devolution Index which measures the extent of
devolution of 3Fs by States to Panchayats.
yy Based on the index, the best performing states and panchayats have been incentivized
since 2011.

Raj
27.1 Panchayat Empowerment and Accountability Incentive Scheme
yy It is a central sector scheme aimed at incentivization of States for devolving funds,
functions and functionaries (3Fs) to Panchayats and incentivization of Panchayats

Wednesday, 18 October 2017

oB

We define motivation as the processes that account for an individual’s intensity, direction, and persistence of effort toward attaining a goal. 4 While general motivation is concerned with effort toward any goal, we’ll narrow the focus to organizational goals in order to reflect our singular interest in work-related behavior.

The hierarchy, if it applies at all, aligns with U.S. culture. In Japan, Greece, and Mexico, where uncertainty-avoidance characteristics are strong, security needs would be on top of the hierarchy. Countries that score high on nurturing characteristics—Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Finland— would have social needs on top. 6 Group work will motivate employees more when the country’s culture scores high on the nurturing criterion. Maslow’s theory has received wide recognition, particularly among practicing managers. It is intuitively logical and easy to understand. When introduced, it provided a compelling alternative to behaviorist theories that posited only physiological and safety needs as important. Unfortunately, however, research does not validate it. Maslow provided no empirical substantiation, and several studies that sought to validate it found no support for it. 7 There is little evidence that need structures are organized as Maslow proposed, that unsatisfied needs motivate, or that a satisfied need activates movement to a new need level 


Second, a high need to achieve does not necessarily make someone a good manager, especially in large organizations. People with a high achievement need are interested in how well they do personally, and not in influencing others to do well. HighnAch salespeople do not necessarily make good sales managers, and the good general manager in a large organization does not typically have a high need to achieve. 15 Third, needs for affiliation and power tend to be closely related to managerial success. The best managers are high in their need for power and low in their need for affiliation. 16 In fact, a high power motive may be a requirement for managerial effectiveness. 17 The view that a high achievement need acts as an internal motivator presupposes two U.S. cultural characteristics—willingness to accept a moderate degree of risk (which excludes countries with strong uncertainty-avoidance characteristics) and concern with performance (which applies to countries with strong achievement characteristics). This combination is found in Anglo-American countries such as the United States, Canada, and Great Britain 18 and much less in Chile and Portugal. Among the early theories of motivation, McClelland’s has had the best research support. Unfortunately, it has less practical effect than the others. Because McClelland argued that the three needs are subconscious—we may rank high on them but not know it—measuring them is not easy. In the most common approach, a trained expert presents pictures to individuals, asks them to tell a story about each, and then scores their responses in terms of the three needs. However, the process is time consuming and expensive, and few organizations have been willing to invest in measuring McClelland’s concep


A recent outgrowth of self-determination theory is self-concordance, which considers how strongly peoples’ reasons for pursuing goals are consistent with their interests and core values. If individuals pursue goals because of an intrinsic interest, they are more likely to attain their goals and are happy even if they do not. Why? Because the process of striving toward them is fun. In contrast, people who pursue goals for extrinsic reasons (money, status, or other benefits) are less likely to attain their goals and less happy even when they do. Why? Because the goals are less meaningful to them. 23 OB research suggests that people who pursue work goals for intrinsic reasons are more satisfied with their jobs, feel they fit into their organizations better, and may perform better.



Herzberg’s methodology is limited because it relies on self-reports. When things are going well, people tend to take credit. Contrarily, they blame failure on the extrinsic environment. 2. The reliability of Herzberg’s methodology is questionable. Raters have to make interpretations, so they may contaminate the findings by interpreting one response in one manner while treating a similar response differently. 3. No overall measure of satisfaction was utilized. A person may dislike part of a job yet still think the job is acceptable overall. 4. Herzberg assumed a relationship between satisfaction and productivity, but he looked only at satisfaction. To make his research relevant, we must assume a strong relationship between satisfaction and productivity.

do your best.” Why? Specificity itself seems to act as an internal stimulus. When a trucker commits to making 12 round-trip hauls between Toronto and Buffalo, New York, each week, this intention gives him a specific objective to attain. All things being equal, he will outperform a counterpart with no goals or the generalized goal “do your best.” If factors such as acceptance of the goals are held constant, the more difficult the goal, the higher the level of performance. Of course, it’s logical to assume easier goals are more likely to be accepted. But once a hard task is accepted, we can expect the employee to exert a high level of effort to try to achieve it. But why are people motivated by difficult goals? 39 First, challenging goals get our attention and thus tend to help us focus. Second, difficult goals energize us because we have to work harder to attain them. Do you study as hard for an easy exam as you do for a difficult one? Probably not. Third, when goals are difficult, people persist in trying to attain them. Finally, difficult goals lead us to discover strategies that help us perform the job or task more effectively. People do better when they get feedback on how well they are progressing toward their goals, because it helps identify discrepancies between what they have done and what they want to do—that is, feedback guides behavior. But all feedback is not equally potent. Self-generated feedback—with which employees are able to monitor their own progress—is more powerful than externally generated feedback


Chung Mong-koo, chairman of Hyundai Motor Company, is well known for articulating difficult and specific goals as a potent motivating force. For example, although Hyundai was a latecomer in the development of a hybrid vehicle, the South Korean automaker launched its first U.S. hybrid in 2010, with annual sales set at 50,000 units. By 2018, the company expects hybrid sales to balloon to 500,000 units worldwide. Challenging employees to reach high goals has helped Hyundai experience tremendous growth in recent years


 Goal-setting theory assumes an individual is committed to the goal and determined not to lower or abandon it. The individual (1) believes he or she can achieve the goal and (2) wants to achieve it. 44 Goal commitment is most likely to occur when goals are made public, when the individual has an internal locus of control (see Chapter 4 ), and when the goals are self-set rather than assigned. 45 Goals themselves seem to affect performance more strongly when tasks are simple rather than complex, well learned rather than novel, and independent rather than interdependent. 46 On interdependent tasks, group goals are preferable. Finally, setting

Women are typically paid less than men in comparable jobs and have lower pay expectations than men for the same work. 77 So a woman who uses another woman as a referent tends to calculate a lower comparative standard. Of course, employers’ stereotypes about women (for example, the belief that women are less committed to the organization or that “women’s work” is less valuable) also may contribute to the pay gap. 78 While both men and women prefer same-sex comparisons, employees in jobs that are not sex segregated will likely make more cross-sex comparisons than those in jobs that are male or female dominated. Employees with short tenure in their current organizations tend to have little information about others inside the organization, so they rely on their personal experiences. Employees with long tenure rely more heavily on co-workers for comparison. Upper-level employees, those in the professional ranks, and those with higher amounts of education tend to have better information about people in other organizations and will make more other– outside comparisons. Based on equity theory, employees who perceive inequity will make one of six choices: 79 1. Change inputs (exert less effort if underpaid or more if overpaid). 2. Change outcomes (individuals paid on a piece-rate basis can increase their pay by producing a higher quantity of units of lower quality). 3. Distort perceptions of self (“I used to think I worked at a moderate pace, but now I realize I work a lot harder than everyone else.”). 4. Distort perceptions of others (“Mike’s job isn’t as desirable as I thought.”). 5. Choose a different referent (“I may not make as much as my brother-in-law, but I’m doing a lot better than my Dad did when he was my age.”). 6. Leave the field (quit

Finally, recent research has expanded the meaning of equity, or fairness. 83 Historically, equity theory focused on distributive justice, the employee’s perceived fairness of the amount rewards among individuals and who received them. But organizational justice draws a bigger picture. Employees perceive their organizations as just when they believe rewards and the way they are distributed are fair. In other words, fairness or equity can be subjective; what one person sees as unfair, another may see as perfectly appropriate. In general, people see allocations or procedure favoring themselves as fair. 84 In a recent poll, 61 percent of respondents said they pay their fair share of taxes, but an almost equal number (54 percent) felt the system as a whole is unfair, saying some people skirt it. 85 Most of the equity

 Early research efforts to isolate leadership traits resulted in a number of dead ends. A review in the late 1960s of 20 different studies identified nearly 80 leadership traits, but only 5 were common to 4 or more of the investigations. 2 By the 1990s, after numerous studies and analyses, about the best we could say was that most leaders “are not like other people,” but the particular traits that characterized them varied a great deal from review to review. 3 It was a pretty confusing state of affairs


Ohio studies in 1940s : initiating structure and consideration
michigan : employee oriented and production oriented.

charismatic
Even in laboratory studies, when people are psychologically aroused, they are more likely to respond to charismatic leaders. 56 This may explain why, when charismatic leaders surface, it’s likely to be in politics or religion, or during wartime, or when a business is in its infancy or facing a life-threatening crisis. Franklin D. Roosevelt offered a vision to get the United States out of the Great Depression in the 1930s. In 1997, when Apple Computer was floundering and lacking direction, the board persuaded charismatic co-founder Steve Jobs to return as interim CEO and return the company to its innovative roots. Another situational factor apparently limiting charisma is level in the organization. Top executives create vision; it’s more difficult to utilize a person’s charismatic leadership qualities in lower-level management jobs or to align his or her vision with the larger goals of the organization. Finally, people are especially receptive to charismatic leadership when they sense a crisis, when they are under stress, or when they fear for their lives. Charismatic leaders are able to reduce stress for their employees, perhaps because they help make work seem more meaningful and interesting. 57 And some peoples’ personalities are especially susceptible to charismatic leadership. 58 Consider self-esteem. An individual who lacks self-esteem and questions his or her self-worth is more likely to absorb a leader’s direction rather than establish his or her own way of leading or thinking.

celebrities on the order of David Beckham and Madonna. Every company wanted a charismatic CEO, and to attract them boards of directors gave them unprecedented autonomy and resources—the use of private jets and multimillion-dollar penthouses, interest-free loans to buy beach homes and artwork, security staffs, and similar benefits befitting royalty. One study showed charismatic CEOs were able to leverage higher salaries even when their performance was mediocre. 59 Unfortunately, charismatic leaders who are larger than life don’t necessarily act in the best interests of their organizations. 60 Many have allowed their personal goals to override the goals of the organization. The results at companies such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and HealthSouth were leaders who recklessly used organizational resources for their personal benefit and executives who violated laws and ethical boundaries to inflate stock prices and allow leaders to cash in millions of dollars in stock options. It’s little wonder research has shown that individuals who are narcissistic are also higher in some behaviors associated with charismatic leadership. 61 It’s not that charismatic leadership isn’t effective; overall, it is. But a charismatic leader isn’t always the answer. Success depends, to some extent, on the situation and on the leader’s vision. Some charismatic leaders—Hitler, for example—are all too successful at convincing their followers to pursue a vision that can be disastrous.



The GLOBE study—of 18,000 leaders from 825 organizations in 62 countries— links a number of elements of transformational leadership with effective leadership, regardless of country. 84 This conclusion is very important because it disputes the contingency view that leadership style needs to adapt to cultural difference




Thursday, 31 August 2017

financial administration

ied. From the 1970s, the need for containment of fiscal deficits through tightened fiscal management, pre-occupied the economists. In the 1980s, the management approach came to be prevalent which included a corporate type of financial management within an overall framework of accountability

A Performance Budget gives an indication of how the funds spent are expected to give outputs and ultimately the outcomes. However, performance budgeting has a limitation - it is not easy to arrive at standard unit costs especially in social programmes which require a multi-pronged approach.

1 The concept of zero-based budgeting was introduced in the 1970s. As the name suggests, every budgeting cycle starts from scratch. Unlike the earlier systems where only incremental changes were made in the allocation, under zero-based budgeting every activity is evaluated each time a budget is made and only if it is established that the activity is necessary, are funds allocated to it. The basic purpose of ZBB is phasing out of programmes/ activities which do not have relevance anymore. However, because of the efforts involved in preparing a zero-based budget and institutional resistance related to personnel issues, no government ever implemented a full zero-based budget, but in modified forms the basic principles of ZBB are often used.

es “The process of budgeting is inherently an exercise in political choice – allocating scarce resources among competing needs and priorities – in which performance information can be one, but not the only factor underlying decision

Firstly, even though performance targets are being developed, they are actually kept separate from the budget not only in South Africa, but also in countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and in most US States, “which undermines their legitimacy,” • Secondly, in the South Africa case, as regards performance information, “outputs are confused with inputs and outcomes remain unconsidered.” Targets appear to have been technocratically identified which therefore lack real world value. Targets are not spelt out in detail making actual measurement unlikely. • Thirdly, and the most important point is that even when effective targets are provided, the budgets in South Africa and many other nations moving toward this kind of system fail to specify who should be accountable for their results, and who should hold them accountable. “Very little thought appears to have been given to the process of institutionalizing political or accountability for the targets identified in their budget”


2 Attempts are continuously being made to overcome as many of the shortcomings as possible. A good example is the trend in OECD countries. The common elements of the budgetary reforms in OECD member countries are:12 i. medium-term budget frameworks; ii. prudent economic assumptions; iii. top-down budgeting techniques; iv. relaxing central input controls; v. focus on results; vi. budget transparency; and vii. modern financial management practices.


Budgeting has traditionally operated on a bottom-up principle. This means that all agencies and all ministries send requests for funding to the finance ministry. These requests greatly exceed what they realistically believe they will get. Budgeting then consists of the Finance Ministry negotiating with these ministries and agencies until some common point is found. This bottom-up system has several disadvantages to it. First, it is very time consuming and it is essentially a game; all participants know that the initial requests are not realistic. Second, this process has an inherent bias for increasing expenditures; all new programmes, or expansion of existing programs, are financed by new requests; there was no system for reallocation within spending ministries and there were no pre-set spending limits. Third, it was difficult to reflect political priorities in this system as it was a bottom-up exercise with the budget “emerging” at the end of this process. This manner of budgeting is now being abandoned and replaced with a new top-down approach to budget formulation. This has been of great assistance in achieving fiscal consolidation. The starting point for the new system is for the government to make a binding political decision as to the total level of expenditures and to divide them among individual spending ministries. This decision is made possible by the medium-term expenditure frameworks which contain baseline expenditure information, i.e. what the budget would look like if no new policy decisions were made. The political decision is whether to increase expenditures for a high-priority area, for example education, and to reduce expenditures, for example defence programs. Only the largest and most significant programmes reach this level of political reallocation. The key point is that each ministry has a pre-set limit on how much it can spend. Once this decision is taken, the Finance Ministry largely withdraws from the details of budgetary allocations for each ministry. The Finance Ministry concerns itself only with the level of aggregate expenditure for each ministry; not the internal allocations. “Each minister is his own Finance Minister,” is the saying in some countries. Each ministry has a total amount and it can freely reallocate that money among its various agencies and programmes. This has several advantages to it. It serves to hamper creeping increases in expenditures as new policies are funded by reallocations from other areas within the ministry. It creates ownership in the respective ministries for the actions that are taken. Decisions are also better informed as spending ministries are in the best position to judge the relative merits of their programmes. The role of the Ministry of Finance is to verify that the offsetting cuts to finance new programmes are real.


Cash and accruals represent two end points on a spectrum of possible accounting and budgeting bases. The cash end of the spectrum has traditionally been applied by Member-countries for their public sector activities. In recent years, there has been a major trend towards accruals end of the spectrum in Member-countries. About half of Member-countries have now adopted accruals to one degree or another. This is a very rapid migration; it was only in the early 1990s that the world’s first accrual basis financial statements and budget were produced by a government (New Zealand).


ii. Sound financial management is the responsibility of all government departments/ agencies: Maintaining financial prudence, discipline and accountability, while Strengthening Financial Management Systems Public Finance Management - Concepts and Core Principles 20 21 at the same time, ensuring prompt and efficient utilization of resources towards achieving organizational goals is the responsibility of all government agencies/ organizations and not only of the Finance wing/Finance Ministry. iii. Medium-term plan/budget frameworks and aligning plan budgets and accounts: Medium-term plan/budget frameworks attempt to bridge the gap between the short-term time horizon of annual budgets with the medium-term objectives of the schemes and programmes of government. Even when there are mediumterm frameworks like five-year development plans, there is need for aligning the annual budgets explicitly with the plans and with the accounting mechanisms so that there is a clear ‘line of sight’ between the medium term developmental plan and the annual budget exercise. iv. Prudent economic assumptions: The economic assumptions that underline the budget have to be prudent and accurate in order to ensure that the budgetary estimates do not go haywire. The tendency to be overly optimistic has to be avoided. v. Top-down budgeting techniques: There is need to shift from the traditional bottom up approach to budgeting to a top-down framework where the desired outcomes should point to the resources required which should be allocated thereafter at the macro level sector-wise. This in turn would lead to focus on outputs and outcomes rather than on inputs and processes. vi. Transparency and simplicity: The budget documents should be simple and easy to comprehend and be available in the public domain. Also the procedures involved in operating the budget and release of funds should be simple. Suitable financial management information systems need to be developed in order to ensure that all transactions are captured and ultimately made available for public scrutiny. vii. Relaxing central input controls: Government agencies need to be given greater operational autonomy and flexibility by consolidating budget items and decentralization of administrative and financial powers. viii. Focus on results: Accountability in government needs to shift from compliance with rules and procedures to achievement of results. This is all the more necessary with relaxed central input controls. There should be emphasis on ‘value for money’. ix. Adopting modern financial management practices: Modern financial management tools like accrual accounting, information technology, financial information systems etc. need to be used to improve decision making and accountability. However, care needs to be exercised to ensure that a congenial environment is created and adequate capacity is developed before adopting new practices. x. Budgeting to be realistic: Unless the projections made in the budget are reasonably accurate, the budgetary exercise loses credibility. 

Monday, 21 August 2017

Examples

Eitch

Policy ecosysstem

With an aim to bring together 32 premier educational and policy research institutions to catalyse the country’s development process, government think-tank NITI Aayog on Wednesday held the first Samavesh meeting. “This is the first ever initiative taken in the country to bring the large number of institutions cutting across diverse domain themes to deliberate together on the way forward for inclusive development of the country,” an official statement on Wednesday said.

The statement further said that as part of Samavesh initiative, a new link on NITI’s website was launched on the occasion which would eventually emerge as a major repository of knowledge based reports and case studies across different sectors of the economy.

The meeting witnessed signing of memorandam of understandings (MoUs) between NITI Aayog and major think tanks across the country to create an ecosphere of evidence-based policy research, it added.

The first meeting of the National Steering Group and other knowledge partners was held under the co-chairmanship of NITI Aayog CEO Amitabh Kant and Principal Adviser NITI Aayog Ratan P Watal.

This network will enable efficient knowledge sharing and information exchange among all partners to achieve a sustainable and more inclusive development in line with the National Development Agenda, Sustainable Development Goals as well as the 15-year vision, 7-year strategy and 3-year action plan, it added.

Friday, 18 August 2017

Smart mbo

The mnemonic S.M.A.R.T. is associated with the process of setting objectives in this paradigm. "SMART" objectives are:

Specific

Measurable

Agreed/Achievable/Attainable

Realistic/Responsible/Receivable

Time-bound

The aphorism "what gets measured gets done", is aligned with the MBO philosophy.

Peter Drucker first used the term "management by objectives" in his 1954 book The Practice of Management.[1] While the basic ideas of MBO were not original to Drucker, they pulled from other management practices to create a complete “system”.[4]The idea draws on the many ideas presented in Mary Parker Follett's 1926 essay, "The Giving of Orders".

Many noteworthy companies have used MBO. The management at the computer company Hewlett-Packard(HP), has said that it considers the policy a huge component of its success. Many other corporations praise the effectiveness of MBO, including Xerox, DuPont, Intel,[8] and countless others.[9] Companies that use MBO often report greater sales rates and productiveness within the organization. Objectives can be set in all domains of activities, such as production, marketing, services, sales, R&D, human resources, finance, and information systems. Some objectives are collective, and some can be goals for each individual worker. Both make the task at hand seem attainable and enable the workers to visualize what needs to be done and how.

Thursday, 17 August 2017

Policy making...from graham alison book essence of decision

The title is based on a speech by John F. Kennedy, in which he said, "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer - often, indeed, to the decider himself."

Tuesday, 15 August 2017

arunachal judgment fall out

  • What is the ambit of discretionary powers of the governor (Note that, U/A 163(2), what falls within the ambit of discretionary power of governor is also a discretion of the governor)
    1. Discretionary powers to be interpreted very narrowly and in a limited manner. A governor can act in his own discretions if his actions are justified by or under the Constitution, but the governor’s exercise of this discretion would be open to challenge where it can be shown to be perverse, capricious, fallacious, extraneous or for a motivated consideration
    2. A governor can’t use his discretionary powers to run a parallel administration or ‘diarchy’ challenging the existence of an elected state government.
    3. Governor is not an elected representative but only an executive nominee whose powers flow from the advice of the cabinet. The governor is not “an all pervading super constitutional authority“.
  • The authority of governor over the speaker
    1. The Governor is not an ombudsman for the Legislature nor the speaker’s mentor. The Governor can’t require the speaker to discharge his functions in the manner he considers constitutionally appropriate
  • Constitutional propriety of governor discharging the speaker’s role such as setting the agenda of the house, interfering in ADL proceedings
    1. Using discretionary powers to summon or dissolve assembly sessions, setting the agenda of the house without the aid and advice of the CM and his Cabinet is unconstitutional
    2. Any action taken by the governor based on the proceedings being carried on under the 10th Schedule would be a constitutional impropriety.
  • Speaker’s authority with respect to Anti Defection law cases and whether such cases can be decided by the speaker at a time when removal proceedings have been initiated against the speaker
    1. The speaker cannot proceed with Anti Defection Law proceedings at a time when a motion for his removal is under consideration of the house. Speaker has to prove constitutional confidence before using the power of adjudication under Xth Schedule. Not doing so would be an “anathema to the concept of constitutional adjudication


  • Primarily wrt judgement on curbing discretionary power of governor
    • Constituent Assembly Debates – Governor could exercise discretionary power in matters of emergency or where they were widely accepted. And Summoning and Dissolving Assembly was one such power.
    • Literal Interpretation of Article 163(2) makes Governor the sole authority on what falls within its discretion. Court can’t exercise JR to judge Governor’s Discretionary power.
    • The SC Judgment reduced Governor to a figurehead
  • However, line of argument should be in favour of SC ruling.
    • The way the office of governor has been utilized – it has affected Centre State Relations
    • Constitution envisages a Parliamentary form also at state level. In a Parliamentary form discretionary power to nominal head militates against the doctrine of limited government
    • Healthy conventions should ideally be developed, which unfortunately has not been the case
    • Punchhi Commission : ambit of discretionary power very narrow. Not to be used in an arbitrary or fanciful manner. Must be a choice dictated by reason, activated by good faith and tempered with caution
Reforms suggested for Office of Governor
  • Sarkaria Commission (1988) & Punchhi Commission (2010) regarding appointment of governor
    • Appoint governor by consulting CoM
    • Politically active persons especially in last 5 years not to be appointed
    • Appoint eminent persons in some walk of life as governor
    • Not to be appointed in home state
    • Not to be from opposite party in a state
    • While recommending President rule, governor to highlight grounds of constitutional machinery failure
    • To be allowed to complete 5 years
    • Should always ask government to prove majority on floor of house
  • Punchhi Commission on removal of governor
    • To be on the same lines as that of President mutatis mutandis (change whatever that needs to be changed)
    • Should be allowed to complete 5 year term

Sunday, 30 July 2017

Imp

http://www.insightsonindia.com/2016/10/06/public-administration-synopsis-2016-mains-writing-challenges/

elenor ostrom

The challenge presented by the Muzaffarnagar riots, therefore, is to somehow democratise police administration that makes it accountable to the people. One way of adding a direct line of accountability to people, in order to generally control and monitor provision of goods and services, is to establish what political scientist Vincent Ostrom calls, “democratic administration.” In democratic administration, the power to oversee provision of goods and services is devolved on multiple “communities of interest.”community policing also needs to be put in here.IT SEEMED to Elinor Ostrom that the world contained a large body of common sense. People, left to themselves, would sort out rational ways of surviving and getting along. Although the world's arable land, forests, fresh water and fisheries were all finite, it was possible to share them without depleting them and to care for them without fighting. While others wrote gloomily of the tragedy of the commons, seeing only overfishing and overfarming in a free-for-all of greed, Mrs Ostrom, with her loud laugh and louder tops, cut a cheery and contrarian figure.
Years of fieldwork, by herself and others, had shown her that humans were not trapped and helpless amid diminishing supplies. She had looked at forests in Nepal, irrigation systems in Spain, mountain villages in Switzerland and Japan, fisheries in Maine and Indonesia. She had even, as part of her PhD at the University of California, Los Angeles, studied the water wars and pumping races going on in the 1950s in her own dry backyard.
All these cases had taught her that, over time, human beings tended to draw up sensible rules for the use of common-pool resources. Neighbours set boundaries and assigned shares, with each individual taking it in turn to use water, or to graze cows on a certain meadow. Common tasks, such as clearing canals or cutting timber, were done together at a certain time. Monitors watched out for rule-breakers, fining or eventually excluding them. The schemes were mutual and reciprocal, and many had worked well for centuries.
Best of all, they were not imposed from above. Mrs Ostrom put no faith in governments, nor in large conservation schemes paid for with aid money and crawling with concrete-bearing engineers. “Polycentrism” was her ideal. Caring for the commons had to be a multiple task, organised from the ground up and shaped to cultural norms. It had to be discussed face to face, and based on trust. Mrs Ostrom, besides poring over satellite data and quizzing lobstermen herself, enjoyed employing game theory to try to predict the behaviour of people faced with limited resources. In her Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University—set up with her husband Vincent, a political scientist, in 1973—her students were given shares in a notional commons. When they simply discussed what they should do before they did it, their rate of return from their “investments” more than doubled.
“Small is beautiful” sometimes seemed to be her creed. Her workshop looked somewhat like a large, cluttered cottage, reflecting her and Vincent's idea that science was a form of artisanship. When the vogue in America was all for consolidation of public services, she ran against it. For some years she compared police forces in the town of Speedway and the city of Indianapolis, finding that forces of 25-50 officers performed better by almost every measure than 100-strong metropolitan teams. But smaller institutions, she cautioned, might not work better in every case. As she travelled the world, giving out good and sharp advice, “No panaceas!” was her cry.
Scarves for the troopsRather than littleness, collaboration was her watchword. Neighbours thrived if they worked together. The best-laid communal schemes would fall apart once people began to act only as individuals, or formed elites. Born poor herself, to a jobless film-set-maker in Los Angeles who soon left her mother alone, she despaired of people who wanted only a grand house or a fancy car. Her childhood world was coloured by digging a wartime “victory” vegetable garden, knitting scarves for the troops, buying her clothes in a charity store: mutual efforts to a mutual end.
The same approach was valuable in academia, too. Her own field, institutional economics (or “the study of social dilemmas”, as she thought of it), straddled political science, ecology, psychology and anthropology. She liked to learn from all of them, marching boldly across the demarcation lines to hammer out good policy, and she welcomed workshop-partners from any discipline, singing folk songs with them, too, if anyone had a guitar. They were family. Pure economists looked askance at this perky, untidy figure, especially when she became the first woman to win a shared Nobel prize for economics in 2009. She was not put out; it was the workshop's prize, anyway, she said, and the money would go for scholarships.
Yet the incident shed a keen light on one particular sort of collaboration: that between men and women. Lin (as everyone called her) and Vincent, both much-honoured professors, were joint stars of their university in old age. But she had been dissuaded from studying economics at UCLA because, being a girl, she had been steered away from maths at high school; and she was dissuaded from doing political science because, being a girl, she could not hope for a good university post. As a graduate, she had been offered only secretarial jobs; and her first post at Indiana involved teaching a 7.30am class in government that no one else would take.
There was, she believed, a great common fund of sense and wisdom in the world. But it had been an uphill struggle to show that it reposed in both women and men; and that humanity would do best if it could exploit it to the full

Monday, 24 July 2017

code of conduct roopa moudgil dig

Roopa Moudgil, the deputy inspector general (prisons) of Karnataka, made it to the national news last week for exposing the special treatment given to AIADMK interim general secretary V K Sasikala, who is lodged in Bengaluru's Parappana Agrahara central prison. The plot thickened on Monday when Moudgil was transferred from her position by the Siddaramaiah government pending an inquiry. Predictably, many television news hosts ran down the Karnataka government on Monday night for shielding the corrupt and punishing the whistleblowers.
There is no doubt that DIG Moudgil honoured her commitment to the public by throwing light on corruption in the jail system. She confirmed what has been widely known for a long time, in fact— the rich and powerful are as a matter of course given VIP treatment even behind bars, such as in the case of mafia don-turned politician Mohammad Shahabuddin, or even Sahara chief Subrata Roy.
The Karnataka government has rightly issued show cause notices to both Rao and Moudgil for violating the code of conduct...[their transfers were also] necessary to ensure a fair enquiry.

She should not have accused the DG of accepting a hefty bribe without substantiation. Secondly, she should not have shared the letter with the media.

It is right for Moudgil to expose the scam, especially as she had the advantage of being an insider. But the way she went about doing it gave rise to a lot of concerns. First, she should not have accused the DG of accepting a hefty bribe without substantiation. Secondly, she should not have shared the letter with the media. DIG Moudgil has, of course, charged that her letter was leaked by Rao, not by herself. But that seems unlikely, since why would Rao choose to put himself under the scanner this way?
DIG Moudgil ought to know that she would have gone down in history as a laudable whistleblower had she demonstrated greater professional conduc

Bureaushaping

WunWun:
Bureau-shaping is a rational choice model of bureaucracy and a response to the budget-maximization model. It argues that rational officials will not want to maximize their budgets, but instead to shape their agency so as to maximize their personal utilities from their work. For instance, bureaucrats would prefer to work in small, elite agencies close to political power centres and doing interesting work, rather than to run large-budget agencies with many staff but also many risks and problems. For the same reasons, and to avoid risks, the bureau-shaping model also predicts that senior government bureaucrats will often favour either 'agencification' to other public sector bodies (as in the UK 'Next Steps' programme) or off-loading functions to contractors and privatization. In the health and social work fields, officials will favour 'deinstitutionalization' and 'care in the community'. The model was developed by Patrick Dunleavy from the London School of Economics in Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice (London: Pearson Education, 1991, reissued 2001).

It was propounded in response to William Niskanen's harsh criticism of Public Bureaucracies in his Budget Maximising Model. The Niskanen model predicts that in representative democracies, public bureaucracies will not only generate allocative inefficiency (by oversupplying public goods) but also x-inefficiency (by producing public goods inefficiently). It is evident that the Niskanen model is heavily reliant on an American institutional milieu. Patrick Dunleavy, a British political scientist who set out to demolish the public choice arguments on bureaucracy, came instead in the end to develop a public choice model of bureaucratic behaviour which combines elements of Peacock’s insight with the original American model. The Dunleavy (1985, p.300) model of public bureaucracy is built on six basic assumptions. The first three are consistent with Niskanen’s model:

(a) bureau policies are set by bureaucrats interacting with the government;

(b) governments largely depend on information from bureaus about the costs and value of producing within given ranges of output; and

(c) bureaucrats maximise their personal utilities (by satisfying "self-regarding, relatively hard-edged preferences") when making official decisions.

Added to these are two 4 assumptions which greatly weaken the budget-maximising conclusion. These are that a bureau’s aggregate policy behaviour is set by some combination of individual decisions made by its officials, although the actual combination that results may be an outcome desired by no bureau member; and that, within broad limits, officials’ influence on bureau policy is always correlated with rank and those nearest the top of bureaus are the most influential. Dunleavy therefore discards Niskanen’s assumption that a bureau’s behaviour will be wholly in line with the preferences of a single senior bureaucrat. In a bureau, where no individual has complete hegemony, budget maximisation is a collective, not an individual good. Rational utility maximising individuals will thus tend to favour strategies that directly advance their personal interests ahead of strategies that advance the collective good. The interaction of the maximising activities of individuals within a bureau will not necessarily lead to budget maximizing.

Tuesday, 18 July 2017

Gst and local tax

When did we see states misusing a provision in GST?

A major tax reform such as the goods and services tax (GST) is bound to have teething problems. This was fully anticipated and taxmen at the state and central levels are geared up to fix them.

What was not anticipated is the introduction of new taxes and levies and new inspections that would thwart the gains of subsuming most indirect taxes other than customs duty into GST, except in the case of those goods and services that have been kept outside the ambit of the tax for the time being.

This must not be allowed and not only must Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu that have initiated new levies in the wake of GST reverse their fiscal impetuousness but the GST Council must resolve against such self-defeatist moves.

The Constitution vests in state governments the authority to decide what taxes and levies local bodies such as municipalities and panchayats would levy, via Article 243H for Panchayats and Article 243X for municipalities.

These articles also authorise states to transfer taxes, collection and grants to local bodies. Articles 243I and 243Y ask the states to set up five-yearly finance commissions to determine how much of their revenues would be devolved to and amongst local bodies.

These provisions fix accountability on state governments to prevent tax adventurism on the part of local bodies while making sure they get adequate resources.

The existing GST rates have been fixed to achieve revenue neutrality. It means that collections under GST would be at least equal to what the states used to collect pre-GST, and the Centre will make good any deficit.

This being the case, states have no justification whatsoever in introducing new levies, such as Maharashtra’s increased vehicle tax or Tamil Nadu’s entertainment tax, to compensate for levies given up, such as octroi.

Now that tax inspectors no longer have to stop vehicles on the road, other babus have taken it upon themselves to stop cargo vehicles on the road for random checks. Such harassment must end, to prevent a revolt against GST. The point is to make GST exhaustive and efficient, not to undermine it.

Monday, 17 July 2017

Niti aayogh


Some other recommedations from NITI Ayog on civil services reforms as mentioned in 3 year action agenda:

- Early promotion to secretary post so that the officer has ample time to take any major initiative and see the changes
- NITI has emphasized on domain specialization of Civil servants hence the current practice of frequent rotational duty amongst different ministries should be replaced with longer postings at one particular ministries in order to   develop domain specialization.
-Additionally we should bring expert talents in civil services through lateral entry
-NITI has made proposal that the Pilot should start from NITI itself and it should be allowed to hire contract based external experts.

Friday, 14 July 2017

Interlinkages

Recent controversy where a bsf jawan posting pics of inadequate quality of food on social media can be potrayed as an example of contribution satisfaction inequilibrium
Zone of indifference -police officials of same caste community ignoring to act on orders .example jat agitation violence
Sorry this is zone of denial
Gave some examples from India like
Integration has happened through 2Ps --
-PARTICIPATION (social audits, hackathon)
-PENETRATION (73rd amendment)
Hence inspite of hvng lesser differentiation we are integrating well nd chalking our way out towards development.
Frm riggs
[12/07 4:57 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Participation-citizen report cards,community policing ,pani panchayat,mohalla sabhas,resident welfare associations,twitter samvad,mygov askinng for feedbackand suggestions
[12/07 4:59 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Penetration-mohalla sabha,dpc,asha workers for health,banking correspondents for finalcial penetration
Lack of integration
In area of Regulation Multiplicity of Finacial regulators And even education sector
  And recommendaation of fslrc for unifed regulator Yashpal comiite For education
 Called for Unified regulatir Fused aspects In tribal areas of india
 Diffracted aspects can be seen in big metros like dekhi Delhi
  Example of civil society participating in policy agenda Linking likert to indian admin
Until police reforms are successfully implemented and a behavioural and structural change is brought in our police system -it will continue to be a system 2 or system 3(likert).so police reforms can ensure police to be a system 4(democratic participative system).
  Linkage of public policy and development admin with systems of likert
System 1 and 2 -as they are not consulatative so -aeroplane model of development
System 4 - more ecological  appriach needed so helicopter approach.
 In chapter of psu-we can link likert systems for explaining low productivity and low profits -because causal variables ,intervening variables and end results are different for system 1and system 4 and mostly our psu are system 1 except few like isro etc
 Ilp: Except ur old air india disinvestment
 Also in todays indian express i came across this ..that the new bjp gvt in up is removing the separate pathways meant fr cyclist next to roads
  The cycling pathways were created by s.p gvt which has cycle as its symbol
 Can we say that states despite losing their fiscal autonomy chose to implement GST because they followed order from the law of situation...rather than being forced by the centre..situation being the need to reduce logistics cost promote ease of doing business etc..
I used nirbhaya social movement (politics )converting into change in criminal ammendment law and improved sensitivity among state organs (pub ad)

Public policy lindblom incrementalism instead of rationalism with 4 rates, exclusions etc more a political compromise - garbage can model. Also impact on funds for lsg, since will depend on state for funds. Co-operative federalism with states and unanimity in legislature while passing the bill.



Tuesday, 11 July 2017

Interlinkages

Recent controversy where a bsf jawan posting pics of inadequate quality of food on social media can be potrayed as an example of contribution satisfaction inequilibrium
Zone of indifference -police officials of same caste community ignoring to act on orders .example jat agitation violence
Sorry this is zone of denial

Gave some examples from India like 
Integration has happened through 2Ps --
-PARTICIPATION (social audits, hackathon)
-PENETRATION (73rd amendment) 
Hence inspite of hvng lesser differentiation we are integrating well nd chalking our way out towards development. 
Frm riggs

[12/07 4:57 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Participation-citizen report cards,community policing ,pani panchayat,mohalla sabhas,resident welfare associations,twitter samvad,mygov askinng for feedbackand suggestions
[12/07 4:59 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Penetration-mohalla sabha,dpc,asha workers for health,banking correspondents for finalcial penetration
[12/07 4:59 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Lack of integration
[12/07 4:59 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: In area of
[12/07 4:59 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Regulation
[12/07 5:00 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Multiplicity of
[12/07 5:00 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Finacial regulators
[12/07 5:00 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: And even education sector
[12/07 5:00 pm] Ilp: And recommendaation of fslrc for unifed regulator
[12/07 5:01 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Yashpal comiite
[12/07 5:01 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: For education
[12/07 5:01 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Called for
[12/07 5:01 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Unified regulatir
[12/07 5:01 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Fused aspects
[12/07 5:01 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: In tribal areas of india
[12/07 5:02 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Diffracted aspects can be seen in big metros like dekhi
[12/07 5:02 pm] Gautam Pub Adm: Delhi

Monday, 3 July 2017

Right to recall ..folletts direct democracy

BHOPAL, APRIL 11. For the first time in the history of Indian democracy, the Madhya Pradesh voters exercised their right to recall and dethroned the president of Anuppur Nagar Panchayat in Shahadol district, Mrs. Pallavika Patel.

Reacting to the event, the Chief Minister, Mr. Digvijay Singh, said the Anuppur example would give a new direction to the country. Accountability was a must in a democracy and the right to recall would strengthen direct democracy in the State.

The State had given the right to recall in cases of directly elected mayors, presidents and sarpanchas in urban civic bodies and panchayats. Mr. Singh was also the first Chief Minister to decentralise powers at the grassroots level by holding panchayat elections as per the 73rd Constitutional amendment.

The counting of votes polled on Monday under the Right to Recall for Annuppur Nagar Panchayat was done yesterday. A total of 5519 votes were cast of which 3255 were in favour of the Empty Chair and only 1678 votes in favour of the Occupied Chair. Under the rules, if more than 50 per cent votes are cast in favour of the unoccupied chair, the present incumbent gets dethroned.

In Madhya Pradesh, the relevant laws have been amended for moving a no-confidence motion against mayors or presidents of urban civic bodies. Under the new dispensation, a resolution endorsed by three-fourths of the total number of elected corporators or councillors could be submitted to the Collector or Commissioner for the recall of the mayor or president. After verification, the resolution is forwarded to the State Government, which then refers the matter to the State Election Commission for holding polls for the recall of the mayor or president.

MPs and MLAs should be recalled within two years from being elected if 75% of those who voted for them are not satisfied with their performance, according to a bill moved by BJP MP Varun Gandhi.

“Logic and justice necessitate that if the people have the power to elect their representatives, they should also have the power to remove these representatives when they engage in misdeeds or fail to fulfil the duties,” Varun said.

Stating that the countries all over the world have experimented with the concept of Right to Recall, the Lok Sabha MP has proposed an amendment in the Representation of the People Act 1951 through his Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill, 2016. As per the legislation, recalling process can be initiated by any voter of the constituency by filing a petition before the Speaker, signed by at least one-fourth of the total number of electors in that constituency.

After confirming its authenticity, the Speaker will move the application to the Election Commission for its verification and authentication of the voters’ signatures on it. The Commission will verify the signatures on it and will organise the voting on 10 places in the respective constituency of MP or MLA, it says.

If three-fourth of the votes that member was polled in his election, go in favour of the recall process, the member will be recalled, the bill proposes. Within 24 hours of the receipt of the result, the Speaker will notify the result to the general public. Once the seat gets duly vacated the Commission can organise a by-poll in that constituency.

“A free and fair election is the right of the citizens of the country and in the event of their elected representatives no longer enjoying their confidence, the people must have a right to remove them,” Varun said. It is on the edifice of accountability of politicians that the true idea of democracy can be achieved, he added. At present there is no recourse to the electorate if they are unhappy with their elected representative.

The Representation of the People Act, 1951 only provides for vacation of office upon the commission of certain offences and does not account for general incompetence or dissatisfaction of the electorate as a ground for vacation.

Rey npm

The first criticism of NPM involves a paradox of centralisation through decentralisation. To illustrate the point, Kaboolian (1998), and Maor (1999) pointed out that giving public managers more authority to manage programs may result in concentrating decisions making in them. 

Thus, NPM may lead to centralised decision making by public managers, rather than encouraging decentralization in public organizations as it claims.

The second criticism concerns applying private sector management techniques to the public sector. While NPM has encouraged the use of private sector management techniques, there may be risk associated with adopting some private sector practices. Many academic commentators such as Pollitt (1990) and Armstrong (1998) argued that most areas of public service and administration have distinct political, ethical, constitutional and social dimensions and these factors make the public sector different from the private sector.

A complementary view is provided by Savoie (2002) and Singh (2003), who argues that NPM is basically flawed because private sector management practices are rarely adopted into government operations. For them, NPM is inappropriate for the public sector as it has more complex objectives, more intricate accountabilities and a more turbulent political environment than the private sector. 

Moreover, the relationship between public sector managers and political leaders is of a different order to any relationships in the private sector. In support of the above mentioned argument, Painter (1997) contended that there is danger in using private business models in the public sector because of the contextual differences.

Fourthly, Hughes (2003) argued that it is difficult for the government in developing countries to move to contractual arrangements for the delivery of service because the necessary laws and the enforcement of contract are not well established. If informal norms have long deviated significantly from formal ones (with regard to personnel practices, for example), simply introducing new formal rules will not change much. Where specialized skills are in short supply, performance contracts and other output based contracts for complex services may absorb a large share of scarce bureaucratic capacity to specify and enforce them (World Bank, 1997). It seems difficult for developing countries to move away from the bureaucratic system. Hughes (2003) pointed out that this old model of organization allows favoritism and patronage.

this also proved riggs ecological model .

In hong kong contractual appointments were done in sync with the business cycle of economy..this led to loss of moral of the employees leading to reduced productivity